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PALMITATE OR PERMANGANATE:
THE VENEREAL PROPHYLAXIS DEBATE IN BRITAIN,
1916-1926
by
S. M. TOMKINS *
The early twentieth century saw a spate of activity in venereal disease research, with
corresponding health policy implications. In 1913, when the word "syphilis" was first used
with self-conscious daring in the lay press, there were virtually no treatment facilities for
civilians in Britain. Five years later, there was acommitment to universalfree treatmentand
an activepublic debate overthebestmeansofprevention. Mostofthehistorical attention to
thesedevelopments has focused on thisdebate, whichpitted theadvocatesof"medical" and
"moral" prophylaxis against one another with increasing rancour. Indeed, many
contemporaries complained that their mutual hostility distracted practical attention from
the problem of venereal disease. Arguably, further attention to the prophylaxis debate
perpetuates this distortion, especially when many other important topics, such as the
fortunesofthe newtherapies andthe organization ofstateclinics, are largely unchronicled.'
However, the prophylaxis issue merits further investigation for several reasons. First, in
simplest terms there is a need forclarification, as the misleading claims and counter-claims
by both sides have been reflected in the existing historiography. Notably, Bridget Towers'
article, though valuable in many respects, misconstrues the essential issue which divided
the two camps and is factually wrong on several key policy points.2 Secondly, the
prophylaxis debate was the object of extensive contemporary media attention. Given this
prominence, an accurate elucidation of the dispute deserves intrinsic examination.
Furthermore, with its reflection ofattitudes to medical developments and sexual morality,
such a discussion forms the context of further research on related topics. Finally, it
gradually became evident that, contrary to expectations, a treatment-based approach was
not sufficient to prevent further infection (see below). In these circumstances, the fate of
other preventive measures, especially chemical prophylaxis, was far more than an arcane
point of dispute in the fight against one of the leading killer diseases of the period.
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The purpose of this article is to reconstruct the debate between the advocates and
opponents of chemical prophylaxis and to determine precisely what divided them.
Contemporaries and historians alike generally perceived that "the two policies [were]
indeed as widely separated as the poles",3 a view which the widely-publicized bitterness
would seem to confirm. In fact, this paper will argue that very little indeed divided the two
groups. In real policy terms, the debate hinged on the timing of the application of certain
prophylactic chemicals. This intrinsically minor issue was invested with sufficient
importance to draw out a public controversy which was increasingly embarrassing to both
sides. Thus, the venereal prophylaxis debate was both less and more significant than recent
historiography has suggested. The differences between the twogroups were much narrower
than Towers and others have assumed, but the very fact that these points of detail could
generate such hostility reflects the assumptions and preoccupations of the period. These
nuances are fascinating not least for their resonance to an age increasingly aware of the
threat of sexually transmitted diseases.
THE PARAMETERS OF THE PROBLEM
Sir William Osler referred to syphilis as "third or fourth among the killing diseases, and
first among the misery-causing diseases". The 1916 Royal Commission on Venereal
Disease estimated that 10 per cent ofBritain's urban population was infected with syphilis,
and that the incidence of gonorrhoea was much higher.4 Congenital syphilis was widely
viewed as a most tragic manifestation, with the sins of the parent literally visited upon
innocent children. Syphilis was reported to be associated with a majority ofcases ofmental
deficiency, epilepsy, heart disease in children, aortic disease, intrathoracic tumour, metritis,
uterine haemorrhage, paroxysmal haemoglobinuria, interstitial keratitis, primary optic
atrophy, and iritis, and was strongly correlated with ozena, nervous diseases, and
choroiditis.5 Gonorrhoea was rarely fatal, but many contemporary observers believed that
its impact was scarcely less grievous.6 It was more widespread than syphilis and more
difficult to detect and cure, especially in women, in whom it was a majorcause ofinfertility.
Children were again particularly at risk, as passage through the birth canal of an infected
women often resulted in blindness. With its toll in death and disability, and especially
because ofthe hereditary character ofsyphilis, venereal disease was increasingly identified
as a major factor in the physical deterioration of Britain's population.7
Although these high levels ofmortality and misery were well known, treatment facilities
were woefully inadequate. A Local Government Board report by R. W. Johnstone in 1913
noted that many hospitals refused to take any venereal cases, while those that did often
incorporated a punitive element in their regimes. This approach was largely a measure of
'E. B. Turner, letter to Lancet, 1919, ii: 899.
4 P.P. 1916, xvi, Cd. 8189, Royal Commission on Venereal Disease: Final report (o the commissioners.
Carl. H. Browning, 'Investigations on syphilis as affecting the health of the community', Br. med. J., 1914, i:
77-81; see also editorial, 'The syphilitic factor in some obscure diseases', ibid., 103-4.
" See, for example, C. J. MacAlister, 'The influences of venereal diseases', Br. med. J., 1913, ii: 1526-8; H.
Wansey Bayly, 'The diagnosis and treatment of chronic gonorrhoea and its local complications', ibid., i: 584-6.
7 SeeJ. M. Winter, The Great WtaraidtheBritishpeople, London, Macmillan, 1986, ch. I,regarding the concern
over physical deterioration in early twentieth-century Britain.
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the stigma attached to the disease and the common beliefthat it was "self-inflicted"; indeed,
charitable contributions to many hospitals carried the stipulation that funds could not be
used to treat syphilis.8
In the first decade of the century, three medical developments offered potentially
revolutionary changes in venereal disease therapy. In 1906, August Wassermann
developed a reliable test for the detection of syphilis. In the same year, Elie Metchnikoff
demonstrated that venereal infection could be arrested by the application of calomel
ointment after exposure. Other chemicals were soon found to be effective, with
permanganate of potash becoming the most popular. Disinfection was highly effective
against syphilis, and Metchnikoff's disciples claimed some success against gonorrhoea.
Finally, in 1910, Paul Ehrlich announced the discovery of a specific remedy for syphilis
which was patented as "salvarsan". "Neo-salvarsan" was introduced in 1912 and had fewer
serious side effects. None of these advances was fail-safe, and the problem of gonorrhoea
remained largely untouched. The Wassermann test was complicated and expensive to
perform, and was not a hundred per cent accurate. Disinfection was successful under
laboratory conditions, but its practical application was more problematic. Administration of
salvarsan was a complex procedure with significant risks of side effects. Moreover, despite
early optimism that a single dose would suffice, a lengthy course oftreatment was necessary
before a complete cure was established.9 Nonetheless, these developments offered new
methods of prevention and treatment against a disease which was serious enough even
before the upheavals of the First World War.
The growing concern over physical deterioration joined with these therapeutic advances
to stimulate interest andconcern, first within the medical profession and gradually in the lay
press. The call for a Royal Commission to investigate the problem was finally answered
following an International Medical Congress in London in August 1913 where Ehrlich was
the undisputed star.'0 The Commission reported in 1916, and, in the meantime, the
circumstances ofwarhad exacerbated the situation which it had been appointed to consider.
The most obvious concern was venereal disease in the armed forces, with much attention to
its impact on the fighting strength of the army. ' However, at least in the services infected
men were likely to receive prompt and thorough treatment, while venereal disease in the
x P.P. 1913, xxxii, Cd. 7029, Local Government Board: 'Report on venereal diseases', by R. W. Johnstone,
pp. 423-55.
9 Forsummariesofscientific developments regardingvenereal disease,seeJ.Cassel, Thesecretplague: venereal
disea.se in Ca'nada 1838-1939, University of Toronto Press, 1987, chs. 2-3, and introductory material in A.
Brandt, No magic bullet: a social history ofvenereal disease in the United States since 1880, Oxford University
Press, 1985. See also L. Fleck, The genesis and development ofa scientificfact, London, University of Chicago
Press, 1979 (originally published in German in 1935), and indexed reference in the Br. med. J. and Lancet for
contemporary accounts of the new discoveries and their reception in England.
`See editorials and correspondence in Br. med. J., 1913, ii: 194-5 and 269; Hospital, 26 July 1913, p. 500, 2
Aug. 1913, p. 518; Laincet, 1913, i: 1817-19; The Times, 6 Oct. 1913, p. 6; English Review, 1913, 15: 244; Pall
Mall Gazette, 22 July 1913, p. 2; Observer, 10 Aug. 1913, p. 6; Daily Herald, 11 Aug. 1913, p. 3; Manchester
Guardiani, 11 Aug. 1913, p. 7; Dail! Mail, 11 Aug. 1913, p. 4; Daily Telegraph, 27 July 1913, p. 4; Daily News,
15 Aug. 1913, p. 4; DailY Chronicle, I I Aug. 1913, p. 5.
" See Edward H. Beardsley, 'Allied against sin: American and British responses to venereal disease in World
War I', Med. Hist., 1976, 20: 189-202, and Suzann Buckley, 'The failure to resolve the problem of venereal
disease among the troops in Britain during World War I', in Brian Bond and Ian Roy (eds), War and society: a
yearbook ofmilitary history, vol. 2, London, Croom Helm, 1977, pp. 65-85, for accounts ofthe military problem.
The most vocal concern was expressed by political and military leaders from the Dominions, whose troops
stationed in Britain and France experienced among the highest rates of infection.
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civilian population was nearly as serious and much more difficult to detect and control.'2
With millions ofmen in uniform and large numbers ofyoung women living independently
for the first time, the perception of loosened sexual morals was universal. As venereal
diseases were not notifiable, rates of infection were unknown but generally agreed to be
escalating. It was well known that demobilization was usually accompanied by increased
incidence ofvenereal disease, and itwas fearedthat in this respect, as in so many others, the
Great War would prove unprecedented in scope.
Notonly were sexual contacts during the First WorldWarperceived tobe on a new scale,
but they were also believed to be of a new and disturbing type. Whereas traditional
anti-venereal policy had been directed at an identifiable sub-group of professional
prostitutes, in wartime circumstances the focus of concern was the so-called "amateur
prostitute" (or simply "amateur"). This revealing phrase referred to unmarried young
women who freely indulged in sexual intercourse. While opinions on the motives of the
"amateur" weredivided, thepolicy implications ofthis distinction were clear: anti-venereal
measures would have to be aimed at the general population. There was some dispute about
whether soldiers represented a greater threat to women than women did to soldiers, but
eitherwaythe prospect was serious. Asthe warprogressed, there wasabroadconsensus that
venereal disease was a grave social problem requiring immediate and vigorous attention.
THE ORIGINS OF THE DEBATE
Despitegeneral agreement that the problemofvenereal disease demanded speedy action,
there was little unanimity on the direction or substance of anti-venereal policy and
eventually these differences consumed the energies and hampered the activities of the
reformers. The report ofthe Royal Commission requires only a summary here.'-3 Although
it was appointed to consider all means of prevention and treatment and self-professedly
approached its task from a strictly practical standpoint, the Commission's report made
virtually no mention of Metchnikoff's work on disinfection.'4 Its most distinguished
medical member, SirFrederick Mott, had wished toinclude someconsideration ofchemical
prophylaxis, buteventually agreed to the wishes ofthe majority in the interest ofsecuring a
unanimous report. One observer remarked that the commissioners' silence with regard to
disinfection
... was purposive, and attributable either to fear ... of a presumed hostility of 'Public
Opinion', or to their prevailing disapproval of the spread of knowledge concerning the
direct prevention of venereal infections by medical means.'
This view appeared to bejustified by the later actions and pronouncements ofsome of the
commissioners, particularly the chairman, Lord Sydenham (see below). In the event, the
Commission made two main recommendations. First, clinics were to be established in each
local authorityjurisdiction to provide full and free facilities for the diagnosis and treatment
1' Letter to The Times from "M.D.", 10 Jan. 1918, p. 10.
'- See especially Richard Davenport-Hines, Se.. (Ie(ith atnd pu/1ishment, London, Collins, 1990, ch. 6.
' The success of Metchnikoff's experiments with apes was noted, with the comment that "this procedure has
been shown to be also protective to man" but with no further elaboration. (P.P. 1916, xvi, Cd. 8189, p. 59.)
'" SirBryan Donkin, 'The fight against venereal infection', Ninieteenttlh Centimn vandAfter, 1917, 82: 580-95, p.
585; Davenport-Hines, op. cit., note 13 above, p. 223.
385S. M. Tomkins
of venereal diseases (principally salvarsan for syphilis). As well as addressing existing
levels of infection, this policy was also believed to be the most effective form of venereal
prevention. By reducing the pool of carriers, opportunities for new infection would be
correspondingly limited.'6
The second part of the Royal Commission's plan outlined a public education campaign
regarding the dangers of venereal disease and means of avoiding them. This task was
delegated by the Local Government Board (replaced by the Ministry of Health in July
1919) to the National Council for Combatting Venereal Disease (NCCVD), which had
been formed in 1914 but did not become active until the Commission reported. The
NCCVD's executive included several members of the Commission, with Sydenham
assuming the office of President, and received substantial public funds from the Local
Government Board with virtually no scrutiny of its activities. The orientation of
NCCVD propaganda was clear in its very name. A founding member recalled that
"prevention" had originally been intended for the Council's title, but changed to
"'combatting" explicitly to "avoid suggesting that [medical] means should be taken to
prevent infection".18 As Sydenham declared in the House of Lords, knowledge of
preventive techniques "must tend to arouse a certain amount of curiosity and might,
therefore, lead into vice men who would otherwise recoil from it".'9 Council propaganda
emphasized that "abstention from exposure to infection is the only certain safeguard..
continence is to be encouraged by every means and on every ground, both social and
hygienic".20 Indeed, Council lecturers were explicitly forbidden to mention chemical
disinfection.2' Since disinfection appeared to condone or even encourage illicit sexual
activity, the only far-sighted and morally sound policy, according to the Council, was to
treat the problem of sex, and not disease, as paramount.22
From the first, a number of physicians and other observers felt that the education
campaign should include some mention of chemical prophylaxis. They tried for three
years to work for change within the NCCVD, but with increasing frustration which
culminated with a government report on venereal disease prophylaxis in August 1919.23
Membership of the Committee did not include a single advocate of disinfection, and the
orientation of its chairman, Lord Astor, was clear from his later fulminations on the
subject. "I cannot imagine anything more revolting to fathers and mothers", he declared,
I E. Brown, 'The control of syphilis', Naitional Review, 1919, 74: 105-11, p. 107.
1' See Towers, op. cit., note 2 above, regarding the relationship between the NCCVD and Local
Government Board/Ministry of Health.
"x SirCharters Symonds, lettertoLancet, 1919, ii: 1048; alsocited in Davenport-Hines, op. cit., note 13 above, p.
231.
9 House of Lords debates, 2 April 1919, col. 67.
21 NCCVD memorandum published in New Statesman, 29 Nov. 1919, p. 244.
21 'Venereal disinfection', by "Lens" (C. W. Saleeby), New Statesmen, I1 Oct. 1919, p. 31.
22 For examples of statements ofthe "moral approach" to venereal disease, by official NCCVD spokespersons
and others, see Edmund Smith, 'The use of prophylactics in venereal disease', J. Roy. San. Inst., 1919, 40: 83-4;
Hospital, I Dec. 1917, pp. 179-81, and 4 Jan. 1919, pp. 277-8; D. White, 'The prevention of venereal disease in
theory and practice', Loncet, 1919, ii: 844-6; correspondence in Br. med. J., 1917, i: 243-4 and 278-80; and the
series of articles by Sir Francis Champneys in Nineteenth Century and After, 1917-18.
- P.P. 1919, xxx, Cmd. 322, Interdepartmental committee on infectious diseases in connection with
demobilisation-Prophvlaxis againist venereal disease, pp. 427-52 (hereafter Astor report).
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that their sons and daughters should be taught how to indulge in promiscuous sexual
intercourse with impunity ... a combination of Hun material efficiency and Latin
unchastity totally alien to Anglo-Saxon tradition and conscience.24
In the circumstances, the findings ofthe report were predictable. Astor concluded that "the
true safeguard against these diseases is individual continence and a high standard ofmoral
life", and emphatically advised against any recourse to medical prevention.25
Dissatisfaction with the report focused on two issues: the Committee's use of statistics
(usually from military experience), and its narrow terms of reference. The experience of
Portsmouth, where the prominent disinfection activist Sir Archdall Reid had been an army
medical officer and had employed chemical disinfection systematically, became the focal
point of the dispute. The Ministry of Health eventually admitted that the figures cited in
the report as evidence of the failure of disinfection were "several times" too high.26 Later,
Lieutenant-Colonel James W. Barrett of the Australian Army Medical Corps, who had
directed medical services among Australian troops in Egypt, wrote to The Times from
Melbourne to express his concern over the tactics of the Committee. The report stated
explicitly that he had been invited to give evidence, and implied that its conclusions were
significantly based on his experience. Barrett stated that not only had he never given
evidence, but that he had never been invited to do so. His concern was that "the
implication was given that the ... Committee had seriously and properly weighted the
Egyptian evidence"-which strongly supported chemical disinfection.27 Nonetheless,
long after the report was undermined by these revelations, the Ministry of Health and
NCCVD continued to cite it as authoritative proof of the inadvisability of medical
prevention.28
More fundamentally, the report's critics attacked its (self-imposed) terms of
reference.29 The Committee's concern was restricted solely to whether the Government
should officially endorse and supply "packets" to the civilian community.30 This term,
which had arisen in the military, referred to a prophylactic kit (usually a tube of calomel
ointment or a bottle of permanganate, and a cotton swab) to be carried in a pocket for the
purpose ofimmediate self-disinfection following sexual intercourse. For the Committee to
focus on the provision of packets was misleading and irrelevant, as advocates of
disinfection desired only that the education campaign should include information on
medical prevention, and that restrictions on the purchase of disinfectants should be
removed (see below). This was one of a long series of such misapprehensions by the
NCCVD and its supporters. To argue that their critics favoured issuing packets at the
24 Sir Waldorf Astor, quoted in Davenport-Hines, op. cit., note 13 above, p. 238.
25 Astor report, p. 438.
26 Thecontroversy overthe Portsmouth statistics was traced in The Times and the Br.nie(d. J., andculminated in
P.P. 1919, xxxii, Cmd. 505, Statement ofthe Ministrv ofHealth and the War Qffice reg(rdlinig the incidence of
venereal disease among soldiers in Portsmouth and elsewvhere, pp.851-60; see also Sir G. Archdall Reid, The
prevention ofvenerealdisease, London, Heinemann, 1920, pp. 212-23, and letter to Br. med. J., 1920, i: 129, and
letter to The Timties, 10 Dec. 1921, p. 6; Bayly, letter to Br. med. J., 1921, i: 139-40; SPVD executive, letter to The
Times, II May 1920, p. 18.
27 Sir James Barrett to The Time.s, 21 Feb. 1922, p. 6, and 4 Aug. 1922, p. 10.
2$ C. Addison, quoted in The Times, 3 July 1920, p. I1; Viscount Peel, Lords Debate, 16 March 1921, col.
618-19.
2) See Donkin, 'Introduction' to Reid, op. cit., note 26 above, p. 13.
31' Astor report, p. 429.
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taxpayers' expense to the tenderyouth ofthe nation, thereby providing both the suggestion
and the security to engage in sexual relations without fear of consequences, became a
favourite tactic. A typical propaganda statement in the Medical Times3' was headed "Why
the National Council for Combatting Venereal Diseases Does Not Advocate the 'Packet"'
in heavy black letters when, after all, neither did its opponents.
The formation of the Venereal Prevention Committee in September 1919, and the
full-fledged Society for the Prevention of Venereal Disease (SPVD) shortly afterwards,
was the direct outcome of dissatisfaction with the Astor report and the conviction that it
was hopeless to effect change from within the NCCVD. The memberships of the rival
organizations were more striking for their similarities than their differences. Individual
members' stances on venereal disease were rarely part of a consistent public health
philosophy, and the issue attracted many elements of the "lunatic fringe". The most
common strand in both groups was an interest in eugenics and racial purity, a concern
which united the NCCVD President Sydenham and the SPVD's Secretary and most
prominent spokesman, Hugh Wansey Bayly. The SPVD's President and voice in the
House of Lords (where most of the parliamentary debates on venereal disease took place)
was Lord Willoughby de Broke, but its most outspoken public advocates were the
physicians Sir Bryan Donkin and Sir Archdall Reid (also a eugenist).32 Both groups were
deeply concerned about the ravages of venereal disease and, as will be shown, were not
seriously divided in objective policy terms. That the hostility between them escalated as it
did was certainly due in part to personality conflicts. If Sydenham and others in the
NCCVD persisted in misconstruing the "packet" issue, the abrasiveness of Bayly and
Donkin must have been a factor in deteriorating relationships within the anti-venereal
forces.
The SPVD sought to supplement, rather than to oppose or revise, the existing campaign
against venereal disease. The SPVD strongly endorsed the liberal and free provision of
clinics to encourage infected individuals to seek therapy. However, they argued that
provision of treatment was not a sufficient means of prevention. Many victims continued
to be sexually active after becoming infected, and a very high proportion failed to
complete the regime before a cure was established.33 Thus it was necessary to look to other
means to diminish the alarming incidence of new cases.
The SPVD also agreed that abstinence was both intrinsically desirable and the only
absolute preventive of venereal disease, and that all propaganda should emphasize the
virtues of chastity. However, to rely solely on moral suasion had two limitations. First,
while all parties were agreed on the importance of maintaining and improving sexual
morality, all were vague on how this utopian state was to be achieved. Many argued that
sex education must begin early to be effective, while others objected that any mention of
such matters to children would itselfbe an inherently corrupting and perverting influence.
The Royal Commission recommended that instruction should not begin before the age of
" Med. Tiuntes, 1920, 48: v.
V2 Sir Frederick Mott was alsoheavily involved in the SPVD but took little part in the public debate having been
compromised by his accession to the Royal Commission report of 1916.
" Otto May, The prevention of venereal diseases, London, H. Frowle, Hodder & Stoughton, 1918, ch. 2,
'Treatment in relation to prevention', p. 50; The Times medical correspondent, 13 Sept. 1920, p. 7, and 28 Feb.
1921, p. 10; 'The problem of venereal disease', Med. Times, 1920, 48: 53; Bayly, letter to Br. med. J., 1919, ii:
863.
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14 and left the matter up to individual school teachers, leading Reid to conjure up the
image of
... a headmaster at the end of a term, expected to address [leaving boys] in words so
eloquent and wise that they shall cast offimmediately the effects ofyears ofribald training
received during the most impressionable period of life, and ever after be proof against the
temptations of the world.34
The precise content of sex education lectures and moral instruction rarely strayed beyond
exhortations to vigorous outdoor sports and "clean living". Several observers warned
against the danger of syphilophobia, or investing the disease with such horror and loathing
that some victims would be too ashamed to seek treatment, or even be driven to suicide.35
Secondly, the SPVD contended that the prevailing incidence of venereal diseases itself
proved that British mores were far from this ideal of chastity, and presumably a moral
education approach would take a very long time indeed to effect any real improvement. In
their view, the appalling toll of death and disability simply could not await the millenium.
The SPVD disapproved of illicit sex as thoroughly as did the NCCVD, but believed that it
must be accepted as a reality of contemporary social life. In these circumstances, the
SPVD believed that all possible means must be used to combat venereal disease. If
chemical disinfection could arrest its development, there were no defensible grounds for
withholding this information.36 Diminution of disease, and not moral sensibility, was the
crucial consideration. As Reid was wont to say in his standard Army venereal lecture, "I
have talked to you [regarding chastity] until I am tired, and you still go wrong, but I will
not have you bringing these beastly infections to barracks".
These convictions resulted in a three-fold platform. First, the SPVD, which was
supported entirely by voluntary contributions, lobbied for a share of public funding on the
grounds that the NCCVD represented only a narrow part of medical and public opinion.
Secondly, it urged the Ministry of Health and the NCCVD to include information on
disinfection as part of an integrated policy including clinics and sex education. Finally, it
pressed for the removal of restrictions on the sale of chemical prophylactics in the
Venereal Disease Act of 1917. This measure had been intended to abolish quackery in the
treatment of venereal diseases by limiting all medical intervention to qualified
practitioners, a goal heartily supported by the SPVD. However, one consequence was to
restrict access to venereal disinfectants. While it was never illegal to sell such chemicals,
chemists and manufacturers were forbidden to recommend them or to offer oral or written
instructions for their use, even if specifically requested. In practice, access to and publicity
regarding disinfectants were severely curtailed.38 The SPVD sought an amendment to
overcome this obstacle while preserving the fundamental goal of the legislation. Thus, the
3' Reid, op. cit., note 26 above, pp. 111-12.
-3 M. W. Browdy, 'The prevention ofvenereal diseases', Practitioner, 1922, 108: 142-6, p. 146; comment by A.
Powell in discussion on syphilis, Proc. Ro!. Soc Med., 1911-12, 5, p. 187.
36For statements of the SPVD position, see The Times medical correspondent, Feb. 1921, p. 10; letter to
Hospital, 14 Aug. 1920, p. 513, and 'Fighting disease by propaganda', 5 Feb. 1921, p. 429; Br. m0ed. J., 1919, i:
125-7 and 170-71.
37 Reid, 'Venereal disease', Nineteen1th Century anv1d After, 1921, 90: 348-60, p. 355.
8 Davenport-Hines, op. cit., note 13 above, p. 229.
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new society aimed to give the individual full information and the opportunity to exercise
his or her options regarding venereal prevention.
The NCCVD opposed these proposals on both practical and moral grounds. It argued
that the value ofchemical disinfection was not proved; successful experience in the army
was not necessarily applicable to civilian conditions. Furthermore, the circumstances
under which illicit sexual contact often occurred, particularly involving drunkenness,
militated against its efficacy. Indeed, by importing a false sense of security, publicity
regarding disinfection might lead to more sexual activity and even higher levels of
infection.40 To advertise sex as safe amounted to condoning, or even encouraging, vice,
and the SPVD was seen to be deeply inconsistent in counselling continence on the one
hand, and suggesting the means to indulge without fear on the other.4' Conversely, the fear
of contracting venereal disease acted as a deterrent to illicit sex and therefore boosted
public morality. The extreme conviction of some NCCVD members that any sanction of
medical prevention was the thin end of the wedge of sexual licence was on record. In a
highly publicized exchange with Donkin in The Nineteenth Century and After, the
NCCVD Secretary Sir Francis Champneys stated that
... a person dying of syphilis innocently acquired is far better off than a person who
commits either of these mortal sins [fornication and adultery] with complete physical
safety and does not repent.42
In a letter to the New Statesman, another NCCVD stalwart declared that he would
... rather marry my daughter to a man suffering from venereal disease but pure in heart,
than to a man whose idea of sex-relations were based upon and moulded by habitual
indulgence in lust, even though he had contrived ... to avoid all unpleasant bodily
consequences.43
Even granted that many venereal infections were "innocently acquired" (especially by
women who were the victims of unfaithful husbands), the NCCVD believed that the
prevailing high rates ofdisease were preferable to methods ofprevention which publicized
sexual knowledge.
3 For statements ofSPVD policy, see The Times, 3 Sept. 1921, p. 8; 27 Sept. 1919, p.8; 6 Feb. 1920, p. 14; 13
Dec. 1921, p. 6, and 29 Feb. 1922. p. 8; see also a series of articles by Donkin and Hugh Elliott in Nineteenth
Century andAfter, and columns by "Lens" in the New Statesman in 1919-1920, and Reid, op. cit., note 26 above
(which was officially endorsed by the SPVD).
"' For the NCCVD's practical arguments against immediate disinfection, see Thomas Barlow to The Times, 6
Feb. 1919, p. 9; Addison, quoted in The Times, 3 July 1920, p. I1; correspondence in The Times, 29 Nov. 1921, p.
6, and 15 Dec. 1921, p. 8; E. B. Turner, 'The prevention of venereal diseases', Practitioner, 1922, 108: 30-9, pp.
30-7; White, op. cit., note 22 above; correspondence in the Br. med. J., 1917, i: 349-50; 1918, i: 208; 1919, i: 26;
1919, ii: 864; 1920, i: 273-4; 1921, i: 66-7.
" Forthe NCCVD's moral arguments against immediatedisinfection, see Brown, op. cit., note 16above,p. 107;
The Times, 4 June 1921, p. 7; C. J. MacAlister, 'Educational propaganda in relation to venereal diseases', J. Roy.
hist. Pub. Health, 1918, 26: 305-6; J. Rov. San. Inst., 1918, 39: 9, and 1919, 40: 91; and correspondence in the
Br. ined. J., 1916, i: 672; 1919, ii: 831; 1920, i: 29, 98-9 and 311; 1921, i: 66-7 and 246.
42 Champneys, 'Thefightagainst venereal infection: areply toSirBryanDonkin', Nineteenth CenturyandAfter,
1917, 82: 1044-54, p. 1050.
4' Gerald Maberley, letter to New State.sman, 8 Nov. 1919, p. 157.
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Once again, the NCCVD's attack centred on the so-called packet system. According to
its opponents, the SPVD threatened to issue everyone (including impressionable boys and
girls) with free or heavily subsidized packets, which was tantamount to providing the
means to sin with impunity at the taxpayer's expense. "One can imagine", wrote a Bootle
physician, "the feelings of a father whose son had been presented at school with one of
those packets, and told it was human to err, and when they did err they might escape the
consequences by using this".44 Opponents of disinfection were fond of quoting the
American Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels to the effect that the mothers ofAmerica had
... entrusted [their sons] to my keeping with the strong belief that every good and
Christian influence ... will be fostered and even strengthened ... could you expect me to
place ... in the hands ofthese often absolutely innocent boys a 'preventive packet' and to
say ... there is a possibility, or even the remotest probability, that they may need these
'preventives' while on liberty? ... I could not look a boy in the Navy straight in the face
while I appealed to him to lead a clean life ifI were approving the policy and the use of a
measure of this kind.45
The most inflammatory claimed that "the way to the pit used in old days to be paved with
good resolutions: it is now to be macadamized with prophylactic packets".46
The SPVD had never suggested that the Government should provide disinfectants;
merely that it should allow access to them. Indeed, most members were positively opposed
to the "packet system". Reid had criticized its introduction in the army, let alone in civilian
life,47 and de Broke stated in the House of Lords that
I particularly wish to disclaim . .,. that I am here ... to recommend the free issue of what
are called prophylactic packets, because I am strongly of the opinion, if any individual
wishes to expose himself (or herself) to risk and at the same time chooses to take a
disinfectant with him, that he ought to do so at his own expense and not at the expense of
the general public.48
Every time an NCCVD-authored letter or article appeared with a misleading reference to
the "packet system", the SPVD scrupulously followed it up with a correction and policy
statement, but the accusations continued unabated. Bayly wrote in February 1921 that
". . . we have times without number pointed out that we do not advocate the packet
system ... and decline to accept the description ofour policy as 'the issue ofprophylactic
packets to the civilian community"'.49 Following a Lords speech which never so much as
mentioned the word and which was met with a chorus of outrage regarding packets, de
Broke observed bemusedly that
4' Dr Daley (Bootle), in J. Roy. San. Inst., 1918, 39: 6.
41 Josephus Daniels, quoted in Champneys, 'The fight against venereal infection: a further reply to Sir
Bryan Donkin', Nineteenth Century and After, 1918, 83: 611-18, pp. 617-18; see also statement by the
Archbishop of Canterbury, Lords debates, 10 Dec. 1919, col. 865-6.
46 Anonymous letter to Br. med. J., 1920, i: 29. For additional examples ofmisleading references to packets in
The Times correspondence alone, see 31 Dec. 1918, p.9; 6 Feb. 1919, p.9; 6 Oct. 1919, p. 6; 24 Nov. 1919, p. 10;
15 Nov. 1921, p. 14; 29 Nov. 1921, p. 6; 21 Feb. 1922, p. 6.
47 Reid, op. cit., note 26 above, ch. 9, 'Venereal disease in the army'.
48 Lords Debates, 10 Dec. 1919, col. 842.
4' Bayly, to Br. med. J., 1921, i: 247.
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I do not think in the speech I made I mentioned the words 'prophylactic packet'
once ... Words have been rather put into my mouth as if I had come down here to
recommend a whole system by which people would stand at the street corners pressing
prophylactic packets into the hands of passers-by, and providing them in a penny-in-the-
slot machine.50
This contemporary confusion regarding the aims of the SPVD accounts for the
preoccupation (and inaccuracies) of historiographical attention with the "packet" issue.
Towers states that the aim ofthe SPVD was "to promote the prohibited 'packet system"',
and that "the SPVD were quite explicit about the kind of propoganda and packet system
they wished to promote ... Local authorities were to provide these packets which were to
be made up of potassium permanganate and calomel ointment". 5 In fact, from the very
outset, this supposedly most contentious issue between the rival societies was a red
herring. An examination of the evolution of NCCVD and SPVD policies from 1919-26
will reveal that their differences became even slighter as the hostile tone and rhetoric of
the public debate escalated.
THE EVOLVING DEBATE, 1919-1926
As the chemical prophylaxis advocates gathered strength, the NCCVD gradually
modified its position in response to a number of pressures. Although some distinguished
medical authorities opposed chemical disinfection, the weight of scientific opinion
favoured it,52 as did lay attitudes expressed in newspaper editorials and correspondence.
The issue was less the utility of medical prevention per se, than the propriety of the
NCCVD's withholding pertinent information from the public. It was widely agreed that a
private interest group should not be able to curtail such access on the basis of a morality
which did not necessarily reflect medical or general opinion, especially when it received
substantial public funds.5 Finally, following the initial exodus to the SPVD, a steady
trickle ofdefections and/orcalls formoderation within the NCCVD continued. A founding
member urged,
... let the National Council pursue its advocacy ofeducation and early treatment, without
opposing the campaign of others who are out to attack disease and disease alone. If the
National Council cannot bless, why should it curse?54
Finally, the success of the SPVD in attracting members caused the NCCVD to fear for its
monopoly on public funding.
The NCCVD's first concession was to advocate ablution centres to offer "skilled" or
"delayed" disinfection, beginning in early 1919. Although the Council had condoned
" Lords debates, 2 April 1919, col. 93.
'Towers, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 77, 80, 81.
12 Whilethere were many letters inthe medical press fromphysiciansopposing medical prevention, thesetended
to originate with and reiterate the views of a small group of NCCVD-affiliated physicians, especially E. B.
Turner and Douglas White. There was, of course, a similar coterie of SPVD correspondents, but most of the
"spontaneous" correspondence either rejected the NCCVD's restrictive approach to the dissemination of
knowledge or positively favoured the SPVD position.
11 The Times, leading article, 22 Nov. 1921, p. I1, and letter from Aylmer Maude, 12 Nov. 1921, p. 6.
14 Symonds, letter to Lancet, 1919, ii: 1049.
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ablution centres in the military and never explicitly opposed them in civilian life, they
were not actively promoted until self-disinfection was widely publicized, chiefly by
Donkin.55 There were two advantages to such a policy. First, the procedure was performed
by a trained attendant and was therefore more likely to be effective than self-disinfection.
Secondly, the element of delay carried a crucial moral connotation. As Sydenham
explained in the House of Lords,
I strongly feel that there is a distinct moral difference between telling people to go out with
disinfecting packets in their pockets, and urging them, ifthey have fallen into temptation,
to take the earliest possible treatment.56
The difference was between "making it easy and not making it easy for a man to yield to
temptation'.57 Ablution centres were envisaged as a "safety net" for those who fell into
unpremeditated sin. Such individuals were to repair to the nearest centre as soon as
possible aftercontact to abort the possible consequences oftheirrash acts. This distinction
was reflected in the term "early treatment centres", which deliberately avoided the
impression that the Council sanctioned prevention.
The SPVD argued in rebuttal that delayed disinfection was morally identical, but
practically inferior, to immediate self-disinfection. To be effective, ablution centres must
be numerous and their purpose widely and explicitly publicized. The provision of such
facilities implied the same recognition and acceptance of illicit sexual activity for which
the NCCVD condemned its rival. Ablution centres were also as likely to incite vice as
self-disinfection, allowing a man (usually) to plan to indulge in sex safe in the knowledge
that he could visit a nearby centre to avoid the consequences of his act. Indeed, as the
Portsmouth Medical Officer ofHealth observed, the provison ofablution facilities was far
more "suggestive" than merely offering advice to individuals.58 As de Broke stated in the
Lords,
... some would seem to say that there is nothing really very immoral in going round to
what is called an early treatment centre an hour or two after the connection has taken
place; but that there is a difference between the morality of doing that and using certain
disinfectants at the time of exposure to risk. I myself cannot see any great difference
between these two processes.59
A correspondent to The Times put it even more succinctly:
Ifthe critical hour is, say, I1 p.m., they object to the use ofdisinfectant at 10:45, but raise
no objection ifthe treatment is used at I 1:15. The sinner must not prepare for immorality,
but he may use the best means known to science to escape the consequences.60
5 Although the SPVD was not formally inaugurated until December 1919, in the preceding three years there
had been several well-publicized exchanges on the prophylaxis issue in The Times and elsewhere. Donkin
precipitated several debates with letters on prophylaxis on 1 Jan. 1917 (p. 10), 4 Jan. 1918 (p. 5), and 28 Dec.
1918 (p. 7).
56 Lords debates, 2 April 1919, col. 67.
57 SirMalcolm Morris, 'Prophylaxis versusearly preventivetreatment', J. Roy. San. Inst., 1919,40: 90-3, p. 91.
s A. Meams Fraser, 'The prevention ofvenereal diseases',J. Roy. Inst. Pub. Health, 1921,29: 17-25, pp. 22-3.
'9 Lords debates, 10 Dec. 1919, col. 852.
60 Anonymous letter to The Times, 4 January 1919, p. 7.
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Finally, ablution centres would entail considerable public expense. Given that the basis of
the NCCVD's attack on the "packet system" was that taxpayers' money would go to
mitigate the effects of sexual immorality, this irony was not lost on the SPVD, whose
proposals required no govemment expenditure.6'
While the element of delay imparted no moral benefits, it did reduce the likely
effectiveness of the procedure. It was well known that the syphilis spirochete was fragile
and easily destroyed while on the surface of the skin, but much more intractable once it
had penetrated the tissues. While there was no precise consensus on how long the
organism was vulnerable, clearly the sooner disinfectants were applied, the more likely
they were to succeed. The SPVD also pointed out that many of the NCCVD's attacks on
the efficacy of self-disinfection, particularly that illicit sex was often related to
drunkenness, would equally discourage the responsible use of ablution facilities. To be at
all effective, the centres must be prominent and well-publicized; yet, by the same token,
would-be patrons might be reluctant to enter or to queue for service. Finally, no matter
how liberally provided, ablution centres simply would not be convenient enough; even
repentant sinners would be unlikely to go out of their way to reach the nearest facility.62
Indeed, most local authorities, including the London County Council, rejected the
proposal as expensive and impractical.63 This was a severe blow to the NCCVD, which
had conceded the principle of disinfection without securing its desired form.
A few months later, in a policy statement published in The Times and elsewhere, the
NCCVD acknowledged that
... [any] person who has indulged in promiscuous intercourse ... is ... bound in duty to
him (or her) self, and to society to seek means ofcleansing at the earliest possible moment.
For this purpose a thorough local application of soap and water is of great value ...
Soon, the Council allowed that stronger disinfectants were likely to be even more
effective,64 but continued to oppose easier access to such chemicals. The SPVD argued
that in encouraging the use of soap but opposing more effective chemicals, the NCCVD
was again promoting a policy which was indistinguishable on moral grounds, but
practically inferior to its own. As a prominent SPVD activist expostulated, "Palmitate
[soap] is moral, permanganate immoral!"65 Furthermore, soap and water was messy and
unlikely to be practical in the circumstances under which illicit intercourse often occurred
(a great many such contacts were believed to take place out of doors). Sir Archdall Reid
observed that the NCCVD felt it "wicked to provide disinfectants for immediate and
6' For a sample ofcritiques ofthe morality ofablution centres, see Barrett, 'Venereal diseases in Egypt during
the war', Proc. Roy. Soc. Med., 1918-19, 12: 10; 'The problem of venereal disease', Med. Times, 1920, 48: 53;
Br. med. J., 1919, i: 125-7; May, op. cit., note 33 above, p. 102; Reid, op. cit., note 26 above, p. 6, and ch. 13,
'Civilian early treatment centres'.
62 For a sample ofcritiques ofablution centres on practical grounds, see Bayly, 'The pharisaical ostrich', Med.
Times, 1920, 48: 48; letters from Donkin and Reid, Lancet, 1919, ii: 945; May, op. cit., note 33 above, pp.
108-12; Reid, op. cit., note 26 above, p. 6, and ch. 13, 'Civilian early treatment centres'.
63 Bayly, op. cit., note 62 above, p. 47.
64 The Times, leading article, 8 Oct. 1919, p. 9, and letter from White, 24 Nov. 1919, p. 10; see alsocolumns by
Saleeby ("Lens") in New Statesman, I I Oct. 1919, p. 31, and 29 Nov. 1919, p. 244; NCCVD policy statement,
Br. med. J., 1921, : 476.
65 Saleeby, 'Venereal disinfection', New Statesman, I I Oct. 1919, p. 31.
394Venereal prophylaxis debate in Britain, 1916-1926
effective use, but permissible to provide ... disinfectants for delayed and ineffective
use".66
From the beginning, the rival factions had been far more similar than dissimilar, and
from this point their policy proposals were almost indistinguishable. In its concession of
ablution centres and soap cleansing, the NCCVD had all but embraced the principles of
self-disinfection. By 1921, the only distinctions between the SPVD and the NCCVD were
the differences between palmitate and permanganate, and between the application of the
latterat 10:45 or 11:15. Some individuals within the NCCVD acknowledged as much. One
stated that
The N.C.C.V.D. have fundamentally moved from their original position to one which is
practically shared by the S.P.V.D. Let this fact be honestly acknowledged, and let
controversy lead to the amity of union.67
Sir Charters Symonds, who had been a co-founder of the NCCVD, agreed as early as
December 1919 that "there is no difference in moral outlook at all, and it is wrong to
charge those who advocate the logical outcome of our teaching with moral obliquity".68
Strong elements within the NCCVD, however, remained unwilling to concede that there
was any basis for rapprochement with the SPVD, asserting that anyone was "absolutely at
fault ifhe considers-that the policy of the [NCCVD] has in any way approximated to that
of the [SPVD] . . ..69 Although the policy stances of the two organizations had become
virtually identical, the NCCVD continued to feel that there was a deep, if indefinable,
difference between them which prohibited co-operation. The context of their proposals
was crucial, maintaining a concern for a higher social morality vis a vis the SPVD's
acceptance ofillicit sexual activity. No doubt this impasse was partly a consequence ofthe
Council's long-standing equation of self-disinfection with the encouragement of vice.
The end of the unseemly public wrangling of the rival societies finally came in 1923
with the report of the Trevethin Committee on "the best medical measures for preventing
venereal disease in the civil community".70 The Committee was appointed at the
suggestion of Lord Dawson of Penn, one of the most respected medical figures of the
period. Dawson identified two essential issues in the debate over chemical disinfection:
(1) its real efficacy; (2) its ethical justification. The former could be determined only by
scientific specialists, and Dawson urged the appointment ofan impartial expert committee
to provide a definitive answer. If prevention were found to be practical, the ethical
question of its implementation was not a medical preserve but a matter for a "wider
tribunal of thoughtful public opinion".7' General satisfaction and confidence were
expressed in the leadership and membership of the Committee, and the SPVD and
NCCVD both expressed their willingness to co-operate.72
66 Reid, 'The prevention of venereal disease', J. Rov. San. Inst., 1919, 40: 85-9.
67 Quoted in The Times, 20 Feb. 1922, p. 6.
68 Symonds, letter to Lancet, 1919, ii: 1049.
69 Statement of NCCVD executive, The Times, 21 Feb. 1922, p. 6.
70 Report ofthe committee ofinquiry on venereal disease, London, HMSO, 1923, p. 3 (hereafter Trevethin
report).
7' Lord Dawson to The Times, 31 Jan. 1919, p. 9, and 22 Nov. 1921, p. 11.
72 The Times, 20 April 1922, p. 13.
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The Trevethin Committee presented its report in June 1923. The Committee
acknowledged that self-disinfection was virtually a hundred per cent effective under
laboratory conditions, but in practical application "the actual result is often less favourable
than has been claimed". Furthermore,
... the success of any general facilities for self-disinfection is likely in the civil
community to be very small ... our view is that money spent on a general system of
providing facilities for self-disinfection would certainly be less profitable than money
spent either on treatment of disease or on ... measures ofeducation and improvement of
social conditions.73
However, the SPVD had neverclaimed that disinfection was infallible; norhad they called
for a costly "general system of providing facilities". Vis a vis its own stated policy
objectives, the SPVD expressed itself well satisfied with the conclusions of the report,
which stated that
... in view of the fact that disinfection in the case of an individual, if properly and
promptly effected, will in all probability be successful, we do not think that there is any
justification for putting obstacles in the way of individuals who desire to procure the
necessary disinfectants ... we think the law should be altered so as to permit properly
qualified chemists to sell ad hoc disinfectants.74
The NCCVD was mollified by the emphasis on treatment centres and education, and the
two societies agreed to co-operate on the basis of the report. In the event, formal union
never occurred, although by 1924 the respective offices of President were vested in the
same individual, Sir Auckland Geddes, and the former rivalsjoined in urging the Ministry
of Health to implement the recommendations of the report.75
To this point, the Ministry of Health has been mentioned only incidently, as it was
content to give the NCCVD a free rein over the anti-venereal campaign as long as the
latter shared its opposition to medical prevention. This stance was largely due to the
influence of the first Minister of Health, Christopher Addison, and the long-time
(1919-1935) Chief Medical Officer Sir George Newman. Newman admitted that
disinfection was "practicable and effective" but persistently vetoed it on moral grounds.76
In large measure, this objection was based on continued misapprehensions regarding the
SPVD's supposed advocacy of a "packet system",7 despite the latter's repeated policy
statements and requests for interviews at the Ministry to present their position. Even
following the Trevethin report and thejoint pressure of the NCCVD and SPVD to amend
the Venereal Diseases Act regarding disinfection, the Ministry of Health refused to act.
Several attempts by Sir Basil Peto, a Member ofParliament active in the SPVD, to achieve
reform through a private member's bill failed.78 A ruling in 1925 did somewhat loosen
restrictions on the sale of disinfectants by permitting chemists to furnish oral advice, but
" Trevethin report, pp. 6-7.
74 Trevethin report, p. 6.
7' The Times, 24 Aug. 1923, p. 8; 2 Nov. 1923, p. 9; 5 Mar. 1925, p. 11.
76 Towers, op. cit., note 2 above, pp. 81-2.
77 Addison, quoted in The Times, 3 July 1920, p. 11.
7X Commons debates, 16 June 1926, col. 2295-8; 3 Aug. 1926; 15 May 1928, col. 966-9.
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written instructions remained forbidden.79 Even with this latitude, the ambiguities of the
legal position were such that many chemists were unlikely to act.
Towers concludes that the SPVD failed as a pressure group while the NCCVD enjoyed
the favour of the Ministry and garnered all of the public funds available for anti-venereal
work. However, in its early years the NCCVD was less a "pressure group" than an
unofficial but heavily subsidized voice ofMinistry views and policy. Once the path ofthe
NCCVD diverged from that of the Ministry and towards the SPVD position, it equally
failed to influence policy-making. That both societies failed as pressure groups after this
point in their ultimate aim of influencing official policy was less a measure of their own
merits than ofthe absolute opposition ofthe Ministry. Indeed, the NCCVD was ultimately
the victim of its own success in creating an equation between the SPVD, venereal
disinfection, "packets", and sexual immorality.
From the publication of the Trevethin report, public interest in venereal diseases
gradually declined. No doubt sheer ennui was a factor, as was growing concern with
Britain's other social and economic ills in the interwar period. Following the anticipated
post-war high, rates of new infections began to drop, and although venereal diseases
remained a major source of death and misery the sense ofcrisis which had characterized
the late 1910s and early 1920s began to diminish. Finally, much public attention had
centred less on venereal diseases themselves than on the melodrama ofthe public dispute
between the SPVD and NCCVD. Once the wounds between the two societies began to
heal, interest declined correspondingly. The SPVD continued to function throughout the
interwar period, as did the NCCVD in its new guise as the British Social Hygiene Council
from 1925, but neither would again enjoy the public attention which notoriety had brought
in 1919-23.
CONCLUSION
In the hostility and subtleties of the prophylaxis debate, it is easy to lose sight of the
remarkably rapid advances in venereal disease policy in World War I and the underlying
changes in attitude which they signalled. Before World War I, syphilis was a taboo
subject. Five years later, it was the first disease for which the British state provided
universal free treatment. (The actual functioning of the new clinics is an important
question as yet largely unexplored.) Although venereal prevention was not implemented,
the free and (relatively) frank discussion of sexuality which it prompted constituted a
veritable revolution in public discourse.
Yet, to the frustration of many contemporaries, much of this concern and energy was
dissipated in the rivalry between the NCCVD and SPVD. Certainly, the tendency to
hyperbole in both organizations fed the perception that they were widely divided on policy
grounds. The SPVD painted themselves as the vanguard of scientific enlightenment and
branded the NCCVD as moral terrorists who wished to maintain the hell of venereal
disease as a means ofdeterrence. For their part, the NCCVD took the role ofthe upholders
of basic social standards and portrayed the SPVD as inciters of random sex wishing to
corrupt the nation's youth. Historical analysis of the prophylaxis issue has been informed
(and often misinformed) by these terms. Closer examination reveals that there were
7 Davenport-Hines, op. cit., note 13 above, p. 229.
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virtually no policy conflicts, and certainly no substantive ones, between the celebrated
rivals. On the other hand, the fact that such minor differences could inflame such passions
is all the more revealing of the assumptions and tactics of some powerful segments of
opinion and policy-making. In their minds, the differences between palmitate and
permanganate, and between disinfection at 10:45 p.m. and 11:15 p.m., were sufficient to
tolerate the continued high incidence of a devastating and preventable disease.
398